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Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks have a vital role in Critical Infrastructures
(CIs) such as public transports, power generation systems, gas, water and oil industries, so that there
are concerns on security issues in these networks. The utilized Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and
Intelligence Electronic Devices (IEDs) in these networks have resource limitations, which make security
applications a challenging issue. Efficient key management schemes are required besides lightweight
ciphers for securing the SCADA communications. Many key management schemes have been developed
to address the tradeoff between SCADA constrain and security, but which scheme is the most effective is
still debatable. This paper presents a review of the existing key management schemes in SCADA net-
works, which provides directions for further researches in this field.
 2016 Karabuk University. Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
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Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks
play a vital role in modern Critical Infrastructures (CIs) such as
power generation systems, water plants, public transports, gas,
and oil industries [59,6,23,25,24,5]. Conventional SCADA networkshave been initially designed to maximize functionality in closed
operating environments. As a result, a little attention has been paid
to the security [29,46,8,28,30,42,51,37,31].
In today’s competitive markets, it is essential for infrastructures
and industries to connect to the open access networks such as
Internet [5,51,31,61,15,55,10]. Thus, modern SCADA networks have
been exposed to a wide range of network security problems
[46,37,55]. Therefore the security of modern SCADA networks is a
challenging issue [5,51,31,61,55,52].
Due to many specific characteristics of SCADA networks such as
resource limitations in Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) andoi.org/
Table 1
Acronyms in SCADA networks.
Acronym Definition
ASKMA Advance SCADA Key Management Architecture
BITW Bump-In-The-Wire
C2S Controller-to-Subordinate
CA Certificate Authority
CI Critical Infrastructure
CKD Centralized Key Distribution
DCS Distributed Control Systems
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
GK General Key
GSK General Seed Key
HECC Hyper Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
HMI Human Machine Interface
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IED Intelligence Electronic Device
IT Information Technology
KDC Key Distribution Centre
LAN Local Area Network
LEN LENgth of data
LiSH Limited Self-Healing
LKH Logical Key Hierarchy
LTK Long Term Key
MAC Message Authentication Code
MSU Master Station Unit
MTU Master Terminal Unit
PKC Public Key Cryptography
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RI Random Integer
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SKE SCADA Key Establishment
SKMA SCADA Key Management Architecture
SSU Slave Station Unit
TS Time Stamp
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general IT techniques for securing SCADA networks [38,14,48]. This
issue has been extensively investigated by researchers and
professional organizations and several reports and standards have
been developed for securing the SCADA communications
[9,47,8,1,2,32,4]. In other words, the SCADA communications are
vulnerable, which make it prone to several threats. Key manage-
ment schemes are essential for the secure SCADA communications.
However, the utilized key management scheme for a secure
application should incorporate authenticity, confidentiality,
integrity, scalability, and flexibility [25,51,60].
There are several reviews in literatures related to SCADA
networks security [23,25,46,31,39]. Although these review articlesFig. 1. A simplified SCADA
Please cite this article in press as: A. Rezai et al., Key management issue in S
10.1016/j.jestch.2016.08.011are suitable, but there isn’t any review article related to key man-
agement scheme/architecture in SCADA networks in detail.
Motivated by these facts, this paper presents some of the funda-
mental aspects of the security in SCADA networks. The focus will
be on key management schemes/architectures. Some open
research issues related to key management scheme/architecture
in SCADA networks are also highlighted. Table 1 summarizes the
acronyms used through this paper.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
briefly describes the SCADA network architecture. Section 3 pre-
sents security threats in the SCADA networks. Section 4 provides
a literature review of articles related to key management
scheme/architecture in SCADA networks. Some important open
research issues are also presented in this section. Finally, Section 5
concludes this paper.2. SCADA network architecture
SCADA networks are especial computer-based networks and
devices which are designed to monitor and control infrastructures
and industries [46,51,38]. In the SCADA networks, data acquisition
systems, data transmission systems and Human Machine Interface
(HMI) software are integrated for providing the centralized
monitoring and control system for processing outputs and
inputs. SCADA networks are also utilized for collecting field
information, transferring it to a central computer facility, and
displaying the information for users graphically or textually. As a
result, it allows the users to real time monitor or control an
entire network from a remote location. The control of any system,
task, or operation can be performed by user commands or auto-
matically [57,36,51]. Fig. 1 shows a simplified SCADA network
architecture.
SCADA networks typically consist of software and hardware.
Commonly used hardware includes (1) Master Station Unit
(MSU) or Master Terminal Unit (MTU), which is placed at a control
center, (2) sub-MSUs, (3) geographically distributed field sites
consisting of RTUs and IEDs, which monitors sensors and controls
actuators, and (4) communication links and equipment
[51,52,37,39,19,50]. However, in some SCADA networks, sub-
MSUs may not be used. In these cases, the MSU directly connected
to each slave station unit, RTU or IED, using communication links
[46,51,37,50]. In these cases, slave station units provide a direct
interface to control and monitor equipment and sensors. Slave
station units may be directly polled and controlled by the MSU
or MTU. Moreover, slave station units, in these cases, have localnetwork architecture.
CADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 2. General MODBUS frame [45].
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out direct instructions from the MSU or MTU [57,36,51].
The MSU or MTU stores and processes the outputs and inputs
information of slave station units, RTUs or IEDs, while the slave
station units control the local process. The communication links
transfer the information. In addition, the software is programmed
to indicate the SCADA network what and when should be
monitored, what response should be initiated when parameters
go outside acceptable values, and what parameter ranges are
acceptable [57,36,51].
It should be noted that control networks and systems are very
similar in operation, but they have some key differences aspects.
One of the key differences is that control systems such as Distrib-
uted Control Systems (DCS) are typically located within a more
confined factory or plant-centric area in comparison with geo-
graphically dispersed SCADA field sites. DCS communications are
usually performed by using Local Area Network (LAN) technolo-
gies, which are usually high speed and more reliable in comparison
with the long-distance communication systems utilized by SCADA
networks and systems [57]. In other words, SCADA networks and
systems are specifically designed to handle long-distance commu-
nication challenges such as data loss and delays posed by the uti-
lized various communication media. Other control networks and
systems commonly employ greater degrees of closed loop control
than SCADA networks and systems [57]. It is because the control
of industrial processes is usually more complicated than the super-
visory control of distribution processes [57].
Based on the AGA-12 standard, there are about 200 SCADA
protocols. More popular SCADA protocols are MODBUS, DNP3,
and IEC 60870-5-101. Note that none of these protocols contain
security format [25,26,21]. Fig. 2 shows general MODBUS frame
[45].
Shahzad et al. [54] described in detail the SCADA/MODBUS
challenges and issues that are commonly used in transmission.
It should be noted that the trend in the modern SCADA net-
works is leading away from serial communication model towards
IP-based open standards [38]. Moreover, wireless communication
plays an important role in the modern SCADA networks
[6,38,53,34]. Unfortunately, both trends are mainly used for
enhancing the efficiency at the expense of the increasing vulnera-
bility of SCADA communications [38].3. Security threats in SCADA networks
Threats in the SCADA networks can be classified into three
important types: (1) loss of availability, (2) loss of integrity, and
(3) loss of confidentiality [47,17,40,20,16].
3.1. Loss of availability
A loss of availability means a disruption of reliable and timely
access to systems or data. This can delay or disturb the identifica-
tion and isolation of faults, and the restoration of power in abnor-
mal conditions, such as power outage. Moreover, it can reduce the
efficiency of the power supply chain. Since inefficient security
solutions can disrupt time-critical processes and operations in
the SCADA networks, the security solution should be efficient to
preserve availability [40].Please cite this article in press as: A. Rezai et al., Key management issue in S
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This type of threat means unauthorized modification or
destruction of information. The loss of integrity can cause serious
damages to infrastructures. To protect against insider threat,
digital signature and source authentication schemes should be uti-
lized. On the other hand, Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
should be utilized to protect against outsider threats [40].
3.3. Loss of confidentiality
A loss of confidentiality means unauthorized divulgence of
information via eavesdropping. An example of eavesdropping is
to violate consumer privacy by eavesdropping on the energy con-
sumption sent from RTUs or IEDs to user. A common method to
protect against eavesdropping is encrypting SCADA communica-
tions using a secure key [40].
Note that efficient security solutions against these threats
require efficient key management schemes [23,51,40,56].4. Existing key management schemes/architectures
During the last decade, several papers related to the key
management scheme/architecture in SCADA networks have been
published, which can be classified into two important categories:
(1) centralized key distribution architecture such as [52,17,20,12,
18,33,35,36], and (2) decentralized key distribution architectures
or point-to-point architectures such as [51,37,50,22,58].
In the centralized key distribution architecture, the secret key
for secure communication is generated by the trusted Key Distri-
bution Centre (KDC), and then distributed between two nodes,
which will be communicated with each other [52,17,20,12,18,33].
In the decentralized key distribution architecture, there is no
KDC. These architectures are established based on the pre-shared
master keys. These keys allow the establishment of session keys
[51,37,50].
It should be noted that some key management schemes have
been developed, which utilized public key based technique to
secure SCADA communications [51,37,50,17,12]. A Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is defined as a set of securing services, includ-
ing policies, processes, hardware, and software that use Public Key
Cryptography (PKC) to create, manage, distribute, and revoke
digital certificates [6,17,56]. In the PKI, two keys are utilized: (1)
public key, and (2) private key. While only each node knows its pri-
vate key, all other nodes can utilize the public key. In addition in
PKI, documents issued and signed by a third party, which is named
Certificate Authority (CA). The commonly certificate in PKI is X.509
certificate [52,51,17].
Although, the public key based techniques are time-consuming
and power-consuming techniques, investigations show that the
public key techniques such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
are suitable for using in hybrid key management scheme to secure
SCADA communication, when there are enough resources
[51,17,56]. The public key based technique can be used in both
centralized key distribution architectures and the decentralized
key distribution architectures as described in next sections. The
aim of this section is to provide a brief overview of some of these
schemes/architectures, and some important open research issues.
4.1. Literatures review
4.1.1. Centralized key distribution architecture
Beaver et al. [12] proposed a SCADA Key Establishment (SKE).
The basic SKE communication strategy is a Controller-
to-Subordinate (C2S) communication. For example, the MSU-RTUCADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 5. The key management architecture in Choi et al. [18].
Fig. 3. The session key generation process in the SKE [18].
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C2S communication. The SKE utilizes the symmetric cryptosystem
for securing the C2S communications. The session key generation
process in this scheme contains three types of key: (1) Long Term
Key (LTK), (2) General Seed Key (GSK), and (3) General Key (GK).
The session key generation process in this scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 3 [12,18].
In Fig. 3, two nodes in communications share the LTK that is
manually distributed. For example, the sub-MSU randomly gener-
ates a 128 bit Random Integer (RI), and after that it generates a GK
by hashing the RI and GSK. The GK is encrypted before transmis-
sion using the LTK of each RTU or IED. On the other hand, the recei-
ver derives a session key from GK, FLAG, ID, TimeStamp (TS), and
LENgth of data (LEN) [12,18].
The SKE also uses the PKC for securing communication between
MSU and sub-MSUs. In SKE, the KDC assigns each sub-MSU public/
private key pair. After two sub-MSUs communicate in a secure
manner, they should give identical secure keys, which play the
same role as the GK in symmetric cryptosystems [20,12,18].
Dawson et al. [20] only utilized symmetric cryptosystem for
securing SCADA communication. Their SCADA Key Management
Architecture (SKMA) utilizes the following set of keys [20,18].
 Long term node-KDC key: This key is manually shared between
a node and the KDC.
 Long term node-node key: This key is shared between nodes,
which communicate with each other.
 Session key: This key is utilized for the message encryption.
Fig. 4 shows the key establishment protocol in the SKMA
between KDC, node A, and node B.
This key establishment protocol is based on ISO 11770-2 mech-
anism 9 [20,18,33]. In SKMA, a session key is computed using aFig. 4. Key establishment protocol in SKMA [20,18].
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and a timestamp [20].
Choi et al. [18] utilized a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) to provide
the broadcast communication. Fig. 5 shows this key management
architecture, which is named Advance SCADA Key Management
Architecture (ASKMA).
In the ASKMA, the nodes, RTUs, IEDs, sub-MSU, and MSU, are
arranged into two tree structures: n-ary tree and binary tree. All
RTUs and IEDs are located at leaves of this n-ary tree. The sub-
MSUs and MSU are located at levels h ¼ logq2 and 0 of binary tree,
respectively.
The efficiency of the ASKMA [18] is enhanced in ASKMA+ [19]
by providing the multicast communication. In SKMA+, a key struc-
ture is divided into two classes, each class as a LKH structure. These
two classes are connected using Iolus framework [44]. Using Iolus
framework, the multicast and broadcast communications for mul-
tiple RTUs and IEDs are provided.
To address the availability issue in SCADA communications,
Choi et al. [17] proposed hybrid key management architecture.
Fig. 6 shows this key management architecture.
In this key management architecture, the Centralized Key
Distribution (CKD) protocol is applied between MSU and sub-
MSU. The LKH protocol is also applied between sub-MSU and RTUs
or IEDs. The Iolus framework is utilized to connect these two parts.
Rezai et al. [52] developed an advance Hybrid Key Management
Architecture for the SCADA network (HSKMA), which increased the
performance and security of Choi et al. [17] key management
architecture. The HSKMA uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
[43,41,3,49] for communication between MSU and sub-MSUs and
symmetric cryptography between sub-MSUs and its RTUs or IEDs.
This key management architecture supports the three SCADA com-
munications: unicast, multicast and broadcast. This architecture is
shown in Fig. 7.
Jiang et al. [35] proposed a Limited Self-Healing (LiSH) key dis-
tribution, which provides collusion-resistant and revocation capa-
bility for SCADA group communication. Although their scheme,
LiSH, provides all security requirements, it cannot revoke compro-
mised users dynamically. Moreover, it has less efficient during the
multicast communication.
To address the dynamic revocation mechanism, Jiang et al. [36]
proposed LiSH+ scheme. The rekeying procedure of the Jiang et al.
[36] scheme with dynamic revocation mechanism is shown in
Fig. 8.
4.1.2. Decentralized key distribution architectures (point-to-point
architectures)
Kang et al. [37] investigated the key management scheme in the
radial SCADA networks. They supposed that communications in
these networks were only made between the MSU and each RTU
or IED. Fig. 9 shows this key management scheme.
Initiator of SCADA communication in the key management
scheme in [37] is the MSU that asks RTUs or IEDs to provide andCADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
MSU0
MSU1 MSU2 MSUm
SSUrSSU1 SSUr+1 SSU2r SSU(m-1)r+1 SSUmr
Symmetric 
cryptography 
Elliptic curve
cryptography
. . . . . . . . .
. . .
Fig. 7. The key management architecture in Rezai et al. [52]. MSU0: Master Station Unit. MSUi (i 2 ½1;m): sub-MSUi. m: number of sub-MSU. r: number of slave station unit
(RTUs or IEDs) in each sub-MSU.
Fig. 6. The key management architecture in [17].
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slave station unit, RTU or IED, choses a new session key, and then
encrypts this session key using the master key, which is pre-shared
with the MSU. The slave station unit sends this encrypted session
key to the MSU using communication link 2. Finally, the MSU con-
firms this process using communication link 3 [37,50].
Rezai et al. [50] enhanced the performance of the radial SCADA
networks by reducing the network traffic of Kang et al. [37]
scheme. Fig. 10 shows this key management scheme.
In this key management scheme, the security devises on the
MSU generate a new session key based on a timestamp. After that
the MSU encrypts the session key using the master key, which is
pre-shared by slave station unit, and sends it to the slave station
unit using link 1 in Fig. 10. Finally, slave station unit sends the con-
firmmessage to the MSU using link 2 in Fig. 10. On sharing the ses-
sion key, the MSU and slave station devices begin to communicate
using this new session key.
They [51] also enhanced the performance of their previous
works [50] using the hybrid key management scheme for these
networks. In this key management scheme, the ECC is utilized to
refresh the master key, and the symmetric cryptosystem is utilized
to encryption, decryption, and session key update. Fig. 11 shows
the session key update in this key management scheme.
Ebrahimi et al. [22] enhanced the performance of Rezai et al.
[51] using Hyper Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HECC) to refresh
the master key. Fig. 12 shows this key management scheme.Please cite this article in press as: A. Rezai et al., Key management issue in S
10.1016/j.jestch.2016.08.011In this key management scheme, the MSU sends a request mes-
sage to slave station unit, then slave station unit send an accept-
able message to MSU, after receiving request message. Finally,
MSU and slave station unit communicate with each other after
authentication.
Tawde et al. [58] proposed a key management scheme that sat-
isfies SCADA requirements of providing availability and quick
response to real-time SCADA traffic. They installed two Bump-In-
The-Wire (BITW) devices between MSU and slave station unit.
Fig. 13 shows this key management scheme.
In this scheme, encryption and authentication are provided
using symmetric key that should be secretly shared between
MSU and slave station. The CDAC’s sec-KeyD is utilized to provide
the key distribution and key management scheme. The sec-KeyD
protocol is also utilized to automatically revoke section key
periodically.
4.2. Performance evaluation
To give an overview about the performance of each scheme/
architecture, the performance of the most relevant and recent
schemes, based on authors’ opinion, are summarized in Tables 2–4.
Total delay time in Table 2 denotes the sum of the message
encryption/decryption time, group key setup time, certificate veri-
fication time, and data transmission time. In this table, the run
times are based on the Crypto++ 5.6.0 benchmarks [51,17,11].CADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 8. The rekeying procedure of the Jiang et al. [36] scheme with dynamic revocation mechanism.
IEDs
Master Station Communication links Slave Station
Encryption and
Decryption Device
Encryption and
Decryption Device  
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with random generator device
1
2
3
Fig. 9. The key management architecture in [37].
6 A. Rezai et al. / Engineering Science and Technology, an International Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxxX.509.v3 is utilized for the certificate format [51,17,62]. Moreover,
SCADA communication links operate at speeds such as 300 to
19,200 baud rates [51,17,7]. The default baud rates in the MODBUS
implementation are 9600 and 19,200 [51,17]. The delay time at
9600 baud rate should be less than 0.54 s [51,17,13]. The high-
lighted box in Table 2 shows the total delay times that are less thanPlease cite this article in press as: A. Rezai et al., Key management issue in S
10.1016/j.jestch.2016.08.0110.54 s. For example in [17], the message size in the SCADA net-
works is less than 1000, so message encryption time is 18 ls.
The utilized symmetric key size is 128 bits. As a result, key encryp-
tion/decryption time is 3.4 ls. In addition, group key setup phase
requires one exponentiation and one verification operation, so
the group key setup time is 150 ls. Therefore, the total delay time,CADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
IEDs
Master Station Communication links Slave Station
Encryption and
decryption device  
with random generator device
Encryption and
decryption device  
RTUs
Encryption and
decryption device  
1
2
Fig. 10. The key management architecture in [50].
Master Station Communication links Slave Station
• Generate a  new and random session key
• Encrypt this new session key
• Send the encrypted session key
• Receive the encrypted session key
• Decrypt the encrypted session key
• Generate the confirm message
• Encrypt the confirm message
• Send the encrypted confirm message 
• Receive the encrypted confirm message
• Use this new session key to send massage 
in the time stamp
1
2
Fig. 11. The session key update scheme in the key management scheme in [51].
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0.453505 s. for 9600 baud rate.
Another important parameter in the performance evaluation of
SCADA networks is storage cost (the number of required keys,
which should be stored). As RTUs and IEDs are remote from
MSU, they are physically insecure. As a result, they need to period-
ically update the security keys. One the other hand, if the RTU or
IED has many keys and this RTU or IED is compromised, other RTUs
and IEDs, which have those keys become vulnerable. So, the update
process is required. Since the communication and computation
costs of this process increase the number of vulnerable RTUs, IEDs,
and keys, SCADA networks need to reduce the number of stored
keys on each RTU or IED for security and efficiency. Table 3 sum-
marizes the storage cost in the various key management architec-
tures, where r denotes the maximum number of RTUs or IEDs per
sub-MSU, and m denotes the number of sub-MSU.Please cite this article in press as: A. Rezai et al., Key management issue in S
10.1016/j.jestch.2016.08.011In addition, security analysis is an important parameter in the
performance evaluation of the SCADA networks. Note that to share
the group key only with legitimate numbers, several requirements
such as group key secrecy, forward secrecy, and backward secrecy
should be met. The group key secrecy guarantees that it is compu-
tationally infeasible for adversaries to discover any group key. The
forward (backward) secrecy guarantees that passive adversaries
who know a contiguous subset of old group keys (a subset of group
keys) cannot discover subsequent (preceding) group keys. Table 4
shows the security analysis for key management schemes/archi-
tectures presented in Section 4.1 based on security analysis in
[42,19,40,18,27].
Based on our investigations which are shown in Tables 2–4,
each scheme has advantages and disadvantages. For example, Kang
et al. [37] key management scheme has a minimum delay time at
the expense of some vulnerability. Choi et al. [17] key managementCADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 12. Ebrahimi et al. [22] key management scheme.
Fig. 13. Tawde et al. [58] key management scheme.
Table 2
The comparative table for total delay time.
Table 3
The comparative table for the storage cost.
Ref. Device
8 A. Rezai et al. / Engineering Science and Technology, an International Journal xxx (2016) xxx–xxxscheme provides security issues at the expense of maximum delay
time in comparison with other schemes and all schemes/architec-
tures in Tables 2 and 3 can support the MODBUS implementation.MSU0 MSUi Each RTU or IED
Beaver et al. [12] mr r+1 1
Dawson et al. [20] mr r+1 1
Choi et al. [18] 2m+mr r+log2m 2+log2r
Choi et al. [19] m 1+r+log2m 1+log2r
Kang et al. [37] r+1 – 2
Rezai et al. [51] r+1 – 2
Choi et al. [17] m+2 2r+1 1+log2r
Rezai et al. [52] m+2 2r+1 1+log2r4.3. Open research issues
As described in the previous sections, the SCADA networks have
specific limitations, and requirements that introduce new security
concerns. Availability, integrity, and confidentiality are important
security aspects. To circumvent threats against these security
aspects, an efficient key management scheme is required. In SCADAPlease cite this article in press as: A. Rezai et al., Key management issue in SCADA networks: A review, Eng. Sci. Tech., Int. J. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jestch.2016.08.011
Table 4
The security comparison between key management architectures.
Ref. Security requirement
Broadcasting Multicasting Group key security Forward security Backward security Key freshness Availability
Beaver et al. [12] Impossible Impossible – – – Possible –
Dawson et al. [20] Impossible Impossible – – – Possible –
Choi et al. [18] Possible Possible Provide Provide Provide Possible Impossible
Choi et al. [19] Possible Possible Provide Provide Provide Possible Impossible
Kang et al. [37] Impossible Impossible – – – Possible –
Rezai et al. [51] Impossible Impossible – – – Possible –
Choi et al. [17] Possible Possible Provide Provide Provide Possible Possible
Jiang et al. [35] Possible Possible Provide Provide Provide Possible Possible
Jiang et al. [36] Possible Possible Provide Provide Provide Possible Possible
Ebrahimi et al. [22] Possible Possible – – – Possible –
Tawde et al. [58] Impossible Impossible – – – Possible –
Rezai et al. [52] Possible Possible Provide Provide Provide Possible Possible
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symmetric key management alone is sufficient. Asymmetric key
management alone is not suitable due to some RTUs and IEDs lack
of ability to utilize PKC. Symmetric key management alone cannot
provide suitable security [51,56]. As a result, development of effi-
cient hybrid asymmetric and symmetric key management
schemes/architectures is in the focal point of major researches in
this area.
In addition to the research efforts investigated in this paper,
there are some other issues, which still require extensive research
efforts such as public key infrastructures, cryptographic authority
and certificate management in the SCADA key management
scheme, finding vulnerabilities of SCADA networks, distributed
security mechanism, which meet the resource limitations of
SCADA networks, application of cloud security in SCADA networks,
lightweight cryptographic algorithms and protocols and even some
new hardware specifically designed for SCADA networks, Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs), access control, protocol vulnerability
assessment, and firewalls.5. Conclusion
In today’s competitive markets, it is essential to connect SCADA
systems to the open access networks such as Internet. So, the secu-
rity of the SCADA networks is a challenging issue. Key management
is essential for the SCADA communication security. Motivated by
these facts, in this paper, we’ve investigated important security
threats in SCADA networks, and then the ongoing works on SCADA
key management scheme are classified based on their properties.
To complement the review of key management schemes in the
SCADA networks, we then reviewed existing efforts [52,51,37,19,
17,50,20,12,18,22,58,35,36] and highlighted some open research
issues. Based on our investigation, development of efficient hybrid
asymmetric and symmetric key management schemes/architec-
tures is in the focal point of major research in this area.References
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